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Articles
DEFENDING THE PUBLIC GOOD AND
TRADITIONAL SOCIETY: NON-SCRIPTURAL
RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS TO SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE
Donald H.J. Hermann∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal status of same-sex couples in the United States has
A significant legal
changed dramatically over the last decade.1
development affecting the recognition of same-sex marriages was the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in 2003, holding that state
statutes prohibiting private consensual sex between adults, including
adults of the same sex, were unconstitutional.2 In the same year, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declared that denying same-sex
couples the right to marry violated the state constitution.3 The claim to a
right of same-sex marriage, as well as registered domestic partnerships
and civil unions, involves relatively new, and controversial, claims to
legal recognition of same-sex relationships, or what some term “unions
between homosexual persons.”4 This legal recognition has become a
∗
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1
See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 888–89 (Vt. 1999) (concluding that the Vermont
Supreme Court was the first state court to hold that the state constitution required samesex couples to have all the rights and benefits of marriage); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Six
Myths that Confuse the Marriage Equality Debate, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 103, 110 (2011); Lauren
Gambino, Pennsylvania’s Same-Sex Couples Celebrate Right to Marry and Divorce, GUARDIAN
(May 23, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/23/pennsylvania-samesex-marriage-divorce-governor-judge, archived at http://perma.cc/V67M-FC54. As of
January 6, 2014, thirty-six states recognize same-sex marriage. Florida Joins the Wave on
Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2015), available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/01/07/opinion/florida-joins-the-wave-on-same-sex-marriage.html?_r=0, archived at
http://perma.cc/TP9J-8T5F.
2
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 653, 578 (2003).
3
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
4
See, e.g., id. at 980 (“Gay and lesbian couples living together openly, and official
recognition of them as their children’s sole parents, comprise a very recent
phenomenon . . . ”); see also Gary C. Furst, Will the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Be Strike
Three Against Peremptory Challenges?, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 701, 729 (1996) (“The Supreme

1
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source of controversy in the general society, particularly in Europe and
America.5
Claims for recognition of same-sex relationships gave rise to
significant discussions in various Christian denominations in the United
States, including the Episcopal Church, the Presbyterian Church, and the
Lutheran Church.6 It is, however, the Roman Catholic Church that
provided the most significant challenge to same-sex unions. Most of the
early critiques of these relationships on religious grounds were based on
Court has never held that the right to engage in a homosexual lifestyle is a fundamental
right or that homosexuals as a group deserve special protections.”(citing Bowers v.
Harwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986))).
5
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR
FOR WORSE? WHAT WE’VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE 5 (Oxford U. Press 2006) (“[T]he
United States was not the only country in which the debate over same-sex marriage was
taking place . . . gays and lesbians in Denmark and elsewhere in Scandinavia began their
public campaign [in the 1960s] for the right to marry.”). “Lesbian and gay Americans, their
friends, and their families strongly support same-sex marriage, while a large number of
traditional family value Americans are dead set against it.” Id. at 13.
6
See TO SET OUR HOPE ON CHRIST: A RESPONSE TO THE INVITATION OF WINDSOR REPORT
¶135, 25 (Episcopal Church Center 2005) [hereinafter TO SET OUR HOPE ON CHRIST]
(expressing the view of the Episcopal Church); SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY ISSUES OF
CIVIL UNION AND CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE 13 (Office of Gen. Assembly Presbyterian Church
(USA) 2010) [hereinafter SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY ISSUES] (explaining the views of the
Presbyterian Church). The Episcopal Church believes that:
For some time now, some members of our Church have been
perceiving that same-sex relations as well as heterosexual relations can
be manifestations of holiness, goodness, and enduring fidelity—just as
same-sex relations as well as heterosexual relations can be
manifestations of abuse, promiscuity, and many other kinds of sin.
TO SET OUR HOPE ON CHRIST, supra, at 25. The Presbyterian Church released an approved
report stating that:
We recognize that our interpretations of Scripture lead us to different
conclusions regarding homosexual behavior and same-gender
partnerships. We hold that the Christian life is one of sanctification,
and we confess that Scripture holds out a transforming hope of radical
change in Jesus Christ that requires us to be dead to sin and alive to all
that is good. For some of us, that means same-gender couples should
be encouraged to abstain from sexual relations; for others of us, that
means that same-gender couples should be encouraged to enter into
faithful, covenanted, lifelong partnerships.
SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY ISSUES, supra, at 13. The Lutheran position was set out in Sex,
Marriage, and Family: A Contemporary Christian Perspective, where it is asserted that: “[t]he
Lutheran Church in American study affirms the traditional view of marriage as between
one man and one woman is God’s intention.” SEX, MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY: A
CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE 10 (Cedric W. Tilberg ed., 1970). But see CHRISTIAN
BATALDEN SCHAREN, MARRIED IN THE SIGHT OF GOD: THEOLOGY, ETHICS, AND CHURCH
DEBATES OVER HOMOSEXUALITY 147 (U. Press of Am. 2000) (“the burden of proof is on the
[Lutheran] church to show why it should not support, encourage, and bless such
covenantal unions [of gay and lesbian couples] as authentic embodiments of our best
teaching on sexuality and marriage”).
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Scriptural authority.7 The significance of the Roman Catholic arguments,
discussed in this Article, is their basis primarily in natural law, a more
philosophical or theological critique, which emphasizes biological
complementarity and the proper end or purpose of sexual relations, and
secondly, claims about the common good. These arguments make a
significant contribution to the general societal discussion of the claims of
same-sex partners to recognition of their relationships; they also
represent the most compelling contemporary religious objections to legal
recognition of same-sex marriage.8
The courts and legislatures that addressed the issue of same-sex
marriage expressed awareness of the importance of this issue to churches
and other religious institutions. For example, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in its Goodridge opinion observed:
Many people hold deep-seated religious, moral and
ethical convictions that marriage should be limited to
the union of one man and one woman, and that
homosexual conduct is immoral. Many hold equally
7
See PETER J. GOMES, THE GOOD BOOK: READING THE BIBLE WITH MIND AND HEART 145
(1996) (describing the view of those who condemn homosexuality). A biblical based
condemnation of homosexuality is often expressed this way:
Nearly every such person who acknowledges an aversion to
homosexuality does so on the basis of what he or she believes the Bible
to say, and in their minds there is no doubt whatsoever about what the
Bible says, and what the Bible means. The argument goes something
like this: [h]omosexuality is an abomination, and the homosexual is a
sinner. At Sodom and Gomorrah God punished the cities for the sin of
homosexuality. Saint Paul and the early Christians were equally
opposed to homosexuality, and homosexual practices are condemned
in the New Testament church. Therefore, if we are to be faithful to the
“clear teaching of the scripture, we too must condemn homosexuality;
it is the last moral absolute, and we compromise it at our own peril.”
Id.
8
See CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH: CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING
PROPOSALS TO GIVE LEGAL RECOGNITION TO UNIONS BETWEEN HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS 1
(Pauline Books & Media 2003), available at http://www.clgs.org/files_clgs/article_
cdfconsiderations.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9CLY-XL63 [hereinafter CDF,
CONSIDERATIONS]. The CDF Considerations states:
The present considerations . . . provide arguments drawn from
reason . . . . Since this question relates to the natural moral law, the
arguments that follow are addressed not only to those who believe in
Christ, but to all persons committed to promoting and defending the
common good of society.
Id.; see also Terence J. Lau & William A. Wines, Take Two Tablets and Do Not Call
for Judicial Review Until Our Heads Clear: The Supreme Court Prepares to Demolish
the “Wall of Separation” Between Church and State, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 595, 610–11
(2009) (“a number of religious groups do not view homosexuality as immoral or
wrong”).
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strong religious, moral and ethical convictions that
same-sex couples are entitled to be married, and that
homosexual persons should be treated no differently
than their heterosexual neighbors.
Neither view
answers the question before us. Our concern is with the
Massachusetts Constitution as a charter of governance
for every person properly within its reach. “Our
obligation is to define liberty of all, not to mandate our
moral code.”9
There is also awareness that some churches and religious institutions
fear that legal recognition of same-sex marriage will result in their being
required to participate in or otherwise sanction such unions. The
Supreme Court of California in its In Re Marriage Cases expressed an
awareness of this concern; however, the court opinion maintained that
recognition of same-sex marriage in state law did not impinge upon the
religious belief or practice of any religious sect. The opinion stated that:
Finally, affording same-sex couples the opportunity to
obtain the designation of marriage will not impinge
upon the religious freedom of any religious
organization, official, or any other person; no religion
will be required to change its religious policies or
practices with regard to same-sex couples, and no
religious officiant will be required to solemnize a
marriage in contravention of his or her religious
beliefs.10
Nevertheless, despite such assurance from judges and legislators that
legal recognition of same-sex unions will not implicate churches or
religious institutions, there continues to be significant opposition by
religious authorities to state recognition of same-sex marriage.
Various religious denominations initially based their opposition on
an understanding that the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament’s
condemned homosexuality and, by extension, condemned same-sex
unions.11 Advocacy by religious leaders based on scripture, however,
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (citing Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 653, 571 (2003), quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
10
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 451–52 (Cal. 2008).
11
Religious condemnation of homosexuality has been based on several scriptural texts
including: Genesis, Leviticus, Corinthians, Timothy, and Romans. Genesis 19:1–11 (New
Century Version) (denouncing the sexual attacks on male visitors to Sodom); Leviticus 20:13
9
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clashed with the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and
the establishment clause which imposes strict restriction on the use of
religious authority as the basis for state law; any law which has a
religious base must show a primary secular effect.12 This led religious
critics of same-sex marriage to revise their arguments and cast them as
claims that such laws violated the community moral sense.13 However,
challenges to same-sex marriage laws as immoral became untenable as a
result of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas,
where the Court recognized the majority’s view that a practice is
immoral is “not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice.”14

(New Century Version) (“If a man has sexual relations with another man as a man does
with a woman, these two men have done a hateful sin. They must be put to death.”); 1
Corinthians 6:9–11 (New Century Version) (condemning Sodomites); 1 Timothy 1:8–11
(disapproving immorality with boys and men); Romans 1:22–27 (“[M]en stopped having
natural sex and began wanting each other. Men did shameful things with other men, and
in their bodies they received the punishment for those wrongs.”); see also MARION L.
SOARDS, SCRIPTURE & HOMOSEXUALITY: BIBLICAL AUTHORITY AND THE CHURCH TODAY 23–
24 (Westminster John Knox Press 1955) (stating that the New Testament denounced
homosexual activity).
12
Stone v. Graham, 499 U.S. 39, 41 (1980). The United States Supreme Court has
grappled with the constitutionality of statutes that have a relationship to scripture and
have established the requirement that any such law be a primary secular purpose. Id. The
Court recognized the primary religious nature of the Bible in Stone v. Graham, when it
found a state statute requiring posting of the Ten Commandments in each classroom
unconstitutional. Id. The Court observed, “[t]he Ten Commandments are undeniably a
sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed
secular purpose can blind us to that fact. The Commandments do not confine themselves
to arguably secular matters . . . .” Id. (footnote omitted). In School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp, the Court found unconstitutional a statute requiring the reading of
passages from the Bible at the beginning of each school day. 374 U.S. 203, 203 (1963). The
Court noted that “[s]urely the place of the Bible as an instrument of religion cannot be
gainsaid . . . .” Id. at 224. In McGowen v. Maryland, the Court found constitutional a
Maryland criminal statute known as Sunday Closing laws. 366 U.S. 420, 450–54 (1961).
While recognizing the Scriptural basis of this legislation, the Court held that providing time
for family activities, rest, and entertainment established a secular purpose. Id. at 450. So
long as such laws were not used to coerce religious practice, the Court found them
constitutional. Id. at 454.
13
See Robert P. George & Gerald V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO.
L.J. 301, 301 (1995) (arguing that “homosexual sodomy, is intrinsically nonmarital and
immoral”). However, contraception is also non-marital and immoral, but the authors
maintain that there is a significant distinction that justifies the state in not recognizing
same-sex marriage. Id. See generally David L. Gray, 4 Reasons Why Artificial Birth Control is
Immoral and Unnecessary, DAVIDGRAY (July 22, 2011), http://www.davidlgray.info/blog/
2011/07/four-reasons-why-artificial-birth-control-is-immoral-and-unnecessa/, archived at
http://perma.cc/ZJV3-NQVQ (expressing arguments from Scripture for the reasons
contraceptives are immoral).
14
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78.
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Religious critics of same-sex marriage laws cannot effectively base
their position on scriptural authority or an assertion of social
condemnation of homosexuality as immoral. There must be a showing
of some significant social detriment resulting from same-sex marriage to
justify withholding a claim to the right to marry. This makes the
arguments of the Roman Catholic Church significant since the teaching
Authority or Magisterium of the Church asserts that its opposition is
based not simply on scriptural authority or a religious view of morality,
but concern for the common good and maintenance of a non-theistic
understanding of natural law.15
This Article will identify the most significant arguments developed
by the Magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church in opposition to
recognition of same-sex marriage, excluding those arguments based
primarily on Scripture.
In addition to consideration of specific
arguments addressed to same-sex unions, Part II provides consideration
to the Church’s teaching on homosexuality, which underlies its position
on the subject of same-sex marriage.16 Next, a review will be made of the
arguments by traditionalist theologians and new natural law advocates
who defend the Magisterium’s position.17 These include, for example,
the importance of biological complementarity and the proper end or
purpose of sexual relations and their relation to marriage as the basis for
society.18 This will be followed by an examination of the revisionist
theologians’ critique of the Magisterium’s position and the arguments
they have developed in support of their acceptance of the claim for the
legalization of same-sex marriage.19 These include arguments based on
an understanding of holistic complementarity, a naturalist
understanding of homosexuality, and a broader and more empirically
based understanding of the relationship between marriage and the

See C.J. McCloskey III, The Magisterium and Catholic Social Training, EARLY CHURCH
FATHERS (Aug. 10, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://earlychurchfathers.wordpress.com/2014/08/
10/the-magisterium-and-catholic-social-teaching/, archived at http://perma.cc/6JW7-239B
(explaining the Catholic Social Doctrine).
16
See infra notes 49–80 and accompanying text (discussing two documents created by
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith).
17
See infra notes 81–148 and accompanying text (analyzing the ideas and concepts of
individuals such as John Finnis, John Paul II, Germain Grizez, David Avila, Robert Batule,
Russell Shaw, and Stanley Kurtz).
18
See infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text (stating that there are some who believe
that procreation largely controls the boundaries for marriage).
19
See infra notes 149–89 and accompanying text (providing criticism of the Magisterium
from Daniel Maguire, Jack Bonsor, Todd Salzman, and Michael Lawler).
15
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common good.20 Finally, a concluding assessment will provide the
persuasiveness of religious based arguments for and against recognition
of same-sex marriage.21
II. TEACHINGS OF THE MAGISTERIUM
A. Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Recognition to Unions
Between Homosexual Persons
In 2003, the teaching office of the Magisterium of the Roman Catholic
Church, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (“CDF”),
published Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Recognition to Unions
Between Homosexual Persons.22 While the primary focus of this Article is
opposition to “recognition of homosexual unions,” the next section of
this Article discusses the underlying, or more fundamental, concern with
the morality of homosexual sexual acts.23 Part I of the CDF document,
dealing with same-sex unions, argues that marriage by its nature is
limited to a couple which is sexually or biologically complementary and
whose sexual relations are open to procreation.24 By contrast, the CDF
maintains that homosexual unions involving homosexual sexual acts are
closed to the possibility of reproduction and “do not proceed from a
genuine affective and sexual complementarity.”25 Later in this Article,
consideration will be given to the opposing argument that biological
complementarity and ability to procreate are not essential aspects of
marriage or of the relationship properly understood for which legal
recognition is being sought by same-sex partners.26
The CDF warns in Part II of Considerations that not only should there
be no legal recognition of homosexual unions, but that “de facto
tolerance” of such unions compromises the public good by exposing
young persons to mistaken ideas about sexuality.27 Moreover, the claim
is made that same-sex couples cannot provide the home environment

20
See infra notes 174–76 and accompanying text (expressing the theory that
homosexuality is not a chosen lifestyle, but is something that an individual will discover
throughout his or her life).
21
See infra notes 190–200 (concluding that the Magisterium fails to recognize the good
that can be found from homosexual relationships).
22
CDF, CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 8.
23
Id. (emphasis removed); see supra Part II.A (discussing the proposals which support
homosexual unions).
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
See infra notes 177–89 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of the critics’
arguments against the Magisterium’s current view of homosexual relationships).
27
CDF, CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 8, at 2–3.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 1 [2015], Art. 8

8

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

most conducive to child development.28 The injury to the public good is
a result of the misguidance of children by a bad example involving
public recognition of the acceptability of homosexual acts. Moreover,
because children with same-sex parents are denied the appropriate and
necessary influences for their psychological development, which occurs
by having the contributions of both a male and a female parent.29
Part III of Considerations sets out arguments against legal recognition
of homosexual unions based on right reason, the biological and
anthropological order, and the social order and the legal order.30
Basically, the argument is that civil law cannot contradict right reason or
the natural law and still have binding effect of obedience on the
conscience of the citizen.31 Laws recognizing same-sex marriage violate
the natural law because the effects of such civil laws are an assault on
marriage as an institution resulting in an undermining of the common
good.32 Primarily, this is because recognition of same-sex unions
necessarily involves public validation of homosexual behavior. The
conclusion reached is that “[l]egal recognition of homosexual unions
would obscure certain basic moral values and cause a devaluation of the
institution of marriage.”33 The underlying premise is that the high status
of traditional marriage is undermined by recognition of the alternative of
same-sex marriage as its equivalent. The argument is that traditional
marriage is debased when same-sex marriage is accepted as its equal.
The argument from right reason and natural law theory is rooted in
the biological and anthropological view taken by Considerations: (1)
homosexual unions lack procreative capacity; (2) the use of artificial
reproduction by homosexuals involves an affront to human dignity; and
(3) such same-sex unions lack the conjugal dimension which enables
transmission of new life and promotes mutual assistance.34 The raising
of children by same-sex parents is viewed as necessarily harmful to such
children.35 The absence of sexual complementarity is viewed as creating
obstacles to normal development of children.36 The claim is that ideal
heterosexual child rearing necessarily includes a male and a female
component. Consequently, adoption by same-sex persons is viewed as
Id.
See id. (expressing the potential concerns with children who are not raised with both a
mother and father).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
CDF, CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 8, at 4.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
28
29
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doing violence to children, because a same-sex parent environment is not
conducive to proper human development, as a result of lack of either a
male or a female element. Later, this Article considers the contrary
claims that children raised by same-sex parents suffer no detriment to
their development or subsequent performance, as measured by
researchers using tools of psychological and behavioral evaluation.37
Considerations maintains that recognition of homosexual unions
would radically transform the institution of marriage by separating
procreation and the raising of children from the institution of marriage.38
Of course, one response is that not all marriages do or can involve
children. For example, a marriage involving a sterile partner or a postmenopausal wife are incapable of procreation, although marriages
involving such a person are permitted by both civil law and Roman
Catholic canon law. Moreover, any couple can in fact incorporate
children into their family by adoption or through the use of artificial
reproduction technology.
Nevertheless, Considerations essentially
maintains a definition of marriage as limited to a union of one man and
one woman who have the potentiality to procreate through natural
intercourse.39 The assertion is made that “[t]he inevitable consequence of
legal recognition of homosexual unions would be the redefinition of
marriage . . . .”40 Considerations avoids the charge that such a definitional
argument by its nature is circular by additionally identifying the
essential factors of openness to procreation and possible childrearing,
which are both available only in a heterosexual marriage; same-sex
marriages by their nature will be childless unless there is access to
adoption or reproductive technologies. Both of the latter means of
establishing a family involving children are distinct from natural
childbearing involving natural coital intercourse, which is impossible in
the case of a homosexual union.
Anticipating the charge that the opposition to recognition of
homosexual unions involves a failure to extend civil rights to, and results
in, discrimination against homosexual persons, Considerations explicitly
rejects the claim of those urging homosexual union is required by respect
for the autonomy of, and non-discrimination, against homosexual
persons.41 The argument in Considerations is that homosexual unions are
significantly distinguishable from traditional marriage so that it is not
See infra notes 190–200 and accompanying text (providing counterarguments to the
idea that homosexual couples have a negative impact on the young children they are
raising).
38
CDF, CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 8, at 4.
39
Id. at 2.
40
Id. at 4.
41
Id.
37
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reasonable to claim that such unions are as equal to or the same as
Some revisionist
marriage, so as to require equal treatment.42
theologians discussed in this Article argue that there is, in fact, a basis for
similarity between same-sex and heterosexual relationships in terms of
sexual relationship, primarily as expressions of conjugal love and
intimacy with the consequence that opposition to same-sex unions does
involve discriminatory treatment of homosexual persons whose intimate
sexual relations and commitment are treated differently than those of
heterosexuals.43
Considerations goes on to assert that since married couples contribute
to the continued population of society, this makes it appropriate for the
state to limit its recognition of the institution of marriage to the
traditional heterosexual couple who are potentially capable of natural
This makes heterosexual marriage foundational to
procreation.44
traditional society. Same-sex couples are incapable of making a
contribution to the population through their sexual relations. This view
emphasizes the producing of children as the principal reason for state
recognition of a marriage, rather than the establishment of the
household, or a family, as an independent economic and social unit,
which reduces the possible need for state paternalism which might
otherwise be required by an ill or dependent individual, whether
homosexual or heterosexual, who lacked the support resulting from a
bond of mutual interdependence provided by marriage. Nevertheless, to
the extent that same-sex couples may legitimately claim any of the legal
advantages of marriage resulting from state recognition of heterosexual
Id.
See infra notes 177–89 and accompanying text (discussing the teachings of Salzman
and Lawler).
44
CDF, CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 8, at 5. The Court of Appeals of New York in
Hernandez v. Robles upheld the favored treatment of opposite sex couples on the basis that
natural intercourse between members of the opposite sex increase the likelihood of the
birth of children who need care and that this justifies extending exclusively to their parents
the right to marry. 7 N.Y. 3d. 338, 367 (2006). The opinion of the court reads:
The Legislature could find that this rationale for marriage does not
apply with comparable force to same-sex couples. These couples can
become parents by adoption, or by artificial insemination or other
technological marvels, but they do not become parents as a result of
accident or impulse. The Legislature could find that unstable
relationship between people of the opposite sex present a greater
danger that children will be born into or grow up in unstable homes
than is the case with same-sex couples, and thus the promoting
stability in opposite-sex relationship will help children more. This is
one reason why the Legislature could relationally offer the benefits to
opposite-sex couples only.
Id. at 359.
42
43
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marriage, because they have established a household possibly including
children, Considerations suggests homosexual persons can obtain the type
of benefits available through marrying by the use of various provisions
of the law dealing with the ownership of property (joint ownership),
medical decision making and visitation (advance directives), and
inheritance (wills).45 These legal provisions involve costs and other
burdens for an unmarried couple. Nevertheless, with such legal
recourse available in the law, the argument is made that any charge of
discrimination is mooted since the differences between heterosexual
marriage and same-sex couples justifies the required use of different
legal resources to vindicate the valid interests of the homosexual couple.
Part IV of Considerations maintains that Catholics are obliged to
oppose legal recognition of homosexual unions.46 Catholic politicians
and lawmakers must vote against such legal recognition and seek repeal
of such legislation if it has already been enacted.47 This exhortation
raises issues about the role of conscience and whether the issue of samesex unions in fact implicates the common good in the way the Church
teaches. Nevertheless, Considerations takes the view that the common
good requires the refusal to recognize same-sex unions.48
B. Persona Humana and Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the
Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons
The key Magisterial document on homosexuality is the CDF’s 1986
Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual
Persons.49 This document reaffirmed and expanded the distinctions
made earlier in the 1975 Declaration on Certain Questions Concerning
Sexual Ethics: Persona Humana between the homosexual condition and
Homosexual acts are said to be
individual homosexual acts.50
“intrinsically disordered” because they involve sexual acts which do not
have the possibility of producing an offspring postulated as an essential
CDF, CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 8, at 5.
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 6.
49
CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, ON THE PASTORAL CARE OF
HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS AND NON-DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS 7
(1998), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents
/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homosexual-unions_en.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
7UHA-WUY2 [hereinafter CDF, PASTORAL CARE OF HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS].
50
CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION ON CERTAIN
QUESTIONS CONCERNING SEXUAL ETHICS: PERSONA HUMANA 9 (1977), available at
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_do
c_19751229_persona-humana_en.html,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/TRG5-FXBA
[hereinafter CDF, PERSONA HUMANA].
45
46
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feature of the human sexual act.51 In the terms of Persona Humana,
homosexual acts are viewed as disordered because they are deprived of
their essential and indispensable finality of human sexual intercourse.52
Of course, it may be argued in the alternative that sexual acts vary and
have many dimensions but most significantly are expressions of love,
intimacy, and commitment, and that the possibility of procreation is only
one feature of sexual acts. However, the Magisterium’s view is that
openness to the possibility of procreation is a necessary element of any
legitimate sexual act.53 Both human nature and sexual acts are to be
understood in terms of fixed and permanent principles of natural law,
where “limits [are] imposed by the immutable principles based upon
every human person’s constitutive elements and [essential] relations.”54
An alternate view of natural law emphasizes human development and
social change and evolution as significant factors for an understanding of
natural law that accommodates history and social evolution.55 This
Article later discusses this view.56
The Magisterium claims its approach is not only rooted in natural
law but also has support from the natural sciences.57 In Persona Humana,
sensitivity is shown toward the claim that, at least for some persons,
homosexuality is not a matter of choice but a deep rooted condition
which has likely genetic, psychological, or other foundational
components.58 According to the Magisterium:
Id.
Id.
53
Id. at 6.
54
Id. at 5.
55
See JOHN MAHONEY, THE MAKING OF MORAL THEOLOGY: A STUDY OF THE ROMAN
CATHOLIC TRADITION 79–82 (1987) (discussing varying concepts arising from the theory of
natural law).
56
See infra notes 170–76 and accompanying text (discussing the evolutionary theory).
57
See CDF, PASTORAL CARE OF HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS, supra note 49, at 7 (“[W]e will
focus our reflection within the distinctive context of the Catholic moral
perspective . . . which finds support in the more secure findings of the natural
sciences . . . .”).
58
See HOMOSEXUALITY: SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL ISSUES 378–79
(William Paul et al. eds., 1982) (summing up the conclusion made regarding
homosexuality). The Final Report of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues
Task Force on Sexual Orientation concluded:
While psychoanalytic concepts show considerable promise for the
understanding of homosexuality’s interaction with other aspects of
personality, other models (such as social psychological and
developmental ones) also have much to contribute. Biological models
involving an interaction between genetic factors (that is,
predispositions) and environmental ones are promising and require
further study.
Id.
51
52
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A distinction is drawn, and it seems with some reason,
between homosexuals whose tendency comes from a
false education, from a lack of normal sexual
development, from habit, from bad example, or from
other similar causes, and is transitory or at least not
incurable; and homosexuals who are definitively such
because of some kind of innate instinct or pathological
constitution judged to be incurable.59
One might assume that the recognition of these differences between
various homosexual persons would lead to a moral distinction that
recognizes a significantly different behavior rooted in a deep innate
unchangeable aspect of the human personality. However, there is no
distinction between these two classes of homosexual persons in the
judgment of their acts. Nevertheless, homosexual persons are offered
pastoral care comprised of “understanding and sustained in the hope of
overcoming their personal difficulties.”60 Despite the possibility of an
innate genetic or biological basis for homosexuality, Church teaching
holds that homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered and can in no
case be approved of, and “no pastoral method can be employed which
would give moral justification to these acts on the grounds that they
would be consonant with the condition of such [homosexual] people.”61
The teaching of Persona Humana reiterates the central principle of On
Pastoral Care, which states, “[a]lthough the particular inclination of the
homosexual person is not a sin, it is a more or less strong tendency
ordered toward an intrinsic moral evil [homosexual act], and thus the
inclination itself must be seen as an objective disorder.”62 While this
view does not judge the homosexual person as evil, it does seem to say
that the person who is homosexual has an evil or sinful inclination.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that not only does this view characterize
human acts as evil, it collapses the distinction between ontic evil or premoral evil and moral evil. In the context of homosexual acts, ontic or
pre-moral evil involves consideration of something objectionable (like
cutting off an arm) which can only be judged as a moral evil by
considering the context or circumstances (compare cutting off an arm as
torture with an amputation to save a person’s life). The view being taken
in On Pastoral Care is that no matter what the context and no matter what
the circumstances, homosexual sexual acts are to be considered as moral
59
60
61
62

CDF, PERSONA HUMANA, supra note 50, at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id.
CDF, PASTORAL CARE OF THE HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS, supra note 49, at 8.
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evil.63 This view provides a major focus of criticism by revisionist
theologians who have reflected on this statement and would distinguish
ontic from moral evil in the case of homosexual acts occurring in
circumstances such as a long term loving and committed relationship
existing between same-sex partners, as opposed to homosexual acts
outside of such a relationship.
One of the purposes achieved by the publication of On Pastoral Care
was to counter what was viewed as a too liberal interpretation of Persona
Humana. The Magisterium wanted to make it clear “lest [anyone] be led
to believe that the living out of this orientation in homosexual activity is
a morally acceptable option. It is not.”64 While On Pastoral Care
continues to rely on the Magisterium’s use of natural law to support its
condemnation of homosexual acts, it gives significant attention to
Scriptural treatment of the subject.65 While a consideration of arguments
based on scripture are beyond the scope of this Article, it is noteworthy
that there is explicit rejection of any new exegesis or use of the historicalcritical approach to interpretation of scripture which would assert
anything other than an unbroken tradition of Scriptural condemnation of
homosexuality.
In addition to the natural law and Scriptural based analysis, On
Pastoral Care invokes a sacramental understanding of marriage:
To choose someone of the same-sex for one’s sexual
activity is to annul the rich symbolism and meaning, not
to mention the goals, of the Creator’s sexual design.
Homosexual activity is not a complementary union, able
to transmit life, and so it thwarts the call to life of that
form of self-giving which the Gospel says is the essence
of Christian [marriage].66
There is a presumption that the homosexual is an individual whose
experience is one of isolation who engages in self-regarding sexual
activity. By implication, this view of heterosexual union involves a very
physicalistic understanding of self-giving in human relations since it
postulates an act of sexual self-giving, which is authentic only in
circumstances of genital unity with pre-creational possibility; it ignores
the significance and possibility of psychological aspects of sexual selfgiving, including love and affection.67 The physicalist view taken here
63
64
65
66
67
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Id.
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Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
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leads to the conclusion that the homosexual is incapable of a “selfgiving” same-sex relation, and instead is merely “self-indulgent” “when
they engage in homosexual activity they confirm within themselves a
disordered sexual inclination which is essentially self-indulgent.”68
Moreover, the individuals who constitute the homosexual couple are not
only self-indulgent, they are necessarily unfulfilled and unhappy “[a]s in
every moral disorder, homosexual activity prevents one’s own
fulfillment and happiness by acting contrary to the creative wisdom of
God.”69 The conclusion is that homosexuals are incapable of a loving
committed relationship with the possibility of personal and mutual
fulfillment in their sexual relations. This is the view that there is no such
thing as an active, happy homosexual.
In On the Pastoral Care, there is a denunciation of groups within and
without the Church which try to pressure the Church “to accept the
homosexual condition as though it were not disordered and to condone
homosexual activity.”70 Not only are such influences condemned, but
there is an effort to identify threats to the common good posed by
homosexual acts. First, “the practice of homosexuality may seriously
threaten the lives and well-being of a large number of people.”71 This
also seems to suggest that homosexuals spread disease and cause AIDS.
Second, “[t]he view that homosexual activity is equivalent . . . of conjugal
love, has a direct impact on society’s understanding of the nature and
rights of the family and puts them in jeopardy.”72 This suggests that
homosexuality is similar to lenient divorce laws in weakening the bonds
of heterosexual marriage. A similar argument is that same-sex marriage
weakens marriage because it does not involve the aspect of natural
procreativity. Third, “to claim that the homosexual condition is not
disordered [leads to] . . . other distorted notions and [sexual] practices
gain[ing] ground.”73 This suggests the assertion that acceptance of
homosexuality will lead to claims for acceptance of incest, polygamy,
bestiality, and other forms of currently proscribed sexual practices. This
view was echoed by Justice Scalia, who wrote in his dissent in Lawrence
v. Texas, that legal rejection of laws punishing homosexual acts will lead
to legal recognition of their right to engage in other “immoral” sexual
practices.74 Justice Scalia wrote: “[s]tate laws against bigamy, same sex
marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication,
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

CDF, PASTORAL CARE OF THE HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS, supra note 49, at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589–90 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
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bestiality and obscenity are likewise [behaviors] sustainable only in light
of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of
these laws is called into question . . . .”75
Finally, expanding on the earlier discussion of homosexual
orientation in Persona Humana, the issue is raised whether homosexual
behavior is compelled or to be understood as being the result of human
compulsion:
What is at all costs to be avoided in the unfounded and
demeaning assumption that the sexual behavior of
homosexual persons is always and totally compulsive
and therefore inculpable. What is essential is that the
fundamental liberty which characterizes the human
person and gives him his dignity be recognized as
belonging to the homosexual person as well.76
Here there is a slight suggestion that homosexuality is a psychological
condition subject to possible “cure.” The psychiatric community
challenges this view.77 The stronger suggestion is that homosexual
persons have the ability to control their behavior by sacrifice and that
abstinence is the moral choice that ought to be made; “[t]o refuse to
sacrifice one’s own will in obedience to the will of the Lord is effectively
to prevent salvation.”78 Finally, the Magisterium makes it clear that a
person’s sexual orientation is an aspect of personality and not equated
with the essence of the individual human person; the Church “refuses to
consider the person as a ‘heterosexual’ or a ‘homosexual’ and insists that
every person has a fundamental [human] identity.”79 Many would agree
that sexual identity or sexual orientation does not capture the
significance of the whole person. Yet, the question remains whether
sexual identity is a basic, significant, and perhaps essential aspect of the
human person.80 By separating sexual orientation from human identity
Id. at 590.
CDF, PASTORAL CARE OF THE HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS, supra note 49, at 14–15.
77
See Douglas C. Haldeman, Sexual Orientation Conversion Therapy for Gay Men and
Lesbians: A Scientific Examination, in HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC
POLICY RESEARCH 149–60 (John C. Gonsiorek & James Weinrich eds., 1991) (discussing that
even reparative therapists have conceded that their therapy rarely purges the patient of all
homosexual desire, and there is no hard empirical evidence that it has any long-term effect
on any patients).
78
CDF, PASTORAL CARE OF HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS, supra note 49, at 15.
79
Id. at 18.
80
See Gregory Baum, Catholic Homosexuals: The Self-Affirmation of Gay Catholics Raises
Many Theological Questions, 99 COMMONWEAL 479, 481 (1974) (“[I]t is the task of men and
women who discover a homosexual inclination in themselves to discern whether they are
75
76
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and by separating sexual acts from a person’s identity, it is easier to
maintain the act and status distinction which is at the heart of the
Magisterium’s teaching about the appropriate separation of the
homosexual condition, inclination or status, which is to be met with
compassion from homosexual acts or behavior that is subject to
condemnation.
III. NEW NATURAL LAW AND TRADITIONALIST SUPPORT OF THE TEACHING
OF THE MAGISTERIUM
A. New Natural Law Teaching on Homosexuality Opposed to Same-Sex
Marriage
John Finnis, a professor of law and legal philosophy at Oxford,
provided a significant natural law analysis justifying the condemnation
of homosexual acts, which supports the teaching of the Magisterium on
homosexuality and same-sex marriage.81 Finnis adopts a non-theistic
approach to natural law. While natural law is used to support the
religious objection to same-sex marriage, the natural law objection is not
being presented as a religious objection.
Finnis begins by asserting that the major Greek philosophers,
including Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle condemned homosexual conduct
“as intrinsically shameful, immoral, and indeed depraved and
depraving.”82 It is important for Finnis to establish an ancient Greek bias
against homosexuality because of the close nexus between contemporary
natural law theory and ancient Greek philosophy. If Socrates engaged in
homosexual acts, can it be asserted that such acts violate human nature
since Socrates contributed to the bedrock of a non-theistic understanding
of natural law?
Finnis identifies three principal reasons for the Platonic-Aristotelian
condemnation of homosexual conduct:
(1) The commitment of a man and a woman to each
other in the sexual union of marriage is intrinsically
good and reasonable, and is incompatible with sexual
relations outside of marriage. (2) Homosexual acts are
caught in a phase which prevents them from fulfilling their real possibilities, or whether
homosexuality is a constitutive element of their personality structure.”).
81
See generally John Finnis, Law, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1049–76 (1994) (examining the condemnation of homosexual acts).
82
Id. at 1055. Finnis equates the terms “homosexual activity,” “homosexual acts,” and
“homosexual conduct” and defines them as referring “to bodily acts, on the body of a
person of the same-sex, which are engaged in with a view to securing orgasmic sexual
satisfaction for one or more of the parties.” Id.
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radically and peculiarly non-marital, and for that reason
intrinsically
unreasonable
and
unnatural.
(3) . . . [H]omosexual acts have a special similarity to
solitary masturbation, and both types of radically nonmarital act[s] are manifestly unworthy of the human
being and immoral.83
The positive support for marriage by the ancient Greeks include: (1)
valuing the “familiarity, affection[,] and love between spouses in a
chastely exclusive marriage”; (2) a recognition of marriage as “an
intrinsically desirable friendship between quasi-equals”; and (3) a view
of marriage “as a union not of mere instinct but of reasonable love, and
not merely for procreation but for mutual help, goodwill[,] and
cooperation for their own sake.”84 These three values are not exclusive
to heterosexual marriage, but are in fact the benefits sought by same-sex
couples seeking to marry.
The next issue for Finnis is to justify the exclusiveness of genital sex
to marriage. This involves recognition of the unitive nature of marital
sex which simultaneously supports procreation and mutual love;
“[g]enital intercourse between spouses enables them to actualize and
experience (and in that sense express) their marriage itself, as a single
reality with two blessings (children and mutual affection). Non-marital
intercourse, especially but not only homosexual, has no such point and
therefore is unacceptable.”85
Finnis draws on St. Augustine’s De Bono Coniugali to identify
instrumental aspects of marriage, such as “procreation and education of
children[,]” and non-instrumental aspects including:
friendship
promoted by propagation, remedying the “disordered desire of
concupiscence[,]” and the natural companionship of the two sexes.86
This later effect of marriage gives legitimacy to sterile marriages and
distinguishes them from same-sex unions. Finnis asserts: “in sterile and
fertile marriages alike, the communion, companionship, societas and
amicitia [of members of the two sexes]—their being married—is the very
good of marriage, and is an intrinsic, basic human good, not merely
instrumental to any other good.”87 Finnis’s discussion suggests that it is
wrong to assert that procreation is the end to which marriage is
instrumental, but rather “[p]arenthood and children and family are the
Id. at 1062–63.
Id. at 1063.
85
Id. at 1064.
86
See Finnis, supra note 81, at 1064 (discussing St. Augustine views of marriage in De
Bono Coniugali).
87
Id.
83
84
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intrinsic fulfillment of a communion which, because it is not merely
instrumental, can exist and fulfill the spouses [in a special social sense]
even if procreation happens to be impossible for them.”88
Finnis comes to the central issue of whether sexual acts between
same-sex partners can be legitimate expressions of non-marital
friendship, love, and affection establishing the communion which he
argues is fulfilling to spouses. Finnis asks: “[w]hy is the attempt to
express affection by . . . non-marital sex the pursuit of an illusion?”89
Finnis’ answer focuses on the biological reality of the union of the
reproductive organs of husband and wife in forming a personal reality or
a personal unit capable of reproduction and friendship.90 Without the
relationship of marriage and without the complementarity of
reproductive organs involved in intercourse, there is not only the
absence of the personal unit, but the individuals are using their sexual
organs merely for gratification:
The union of the reproductive organs of husband and
wife really unites them biologically (and their biological
reality is part of, not merely an instrument of, their
personal reality); reproduction is one function and so, in
respect of that function, the spouses are indeed one
reality, and their sexual union therefore can actualize and
allow them to experience their real common good—their
marriage with the two goods, parenthood and
friendship.91
On the other hand two persons who are good friends and cannot marry
(i.e. the same-sex couples) who engage in sexual relations cannot have
children together and “their reproductive organs cannot make them a
biological (and therefore personal) unit.”92
According to Finnis, since same-sex unions cannot experience the
sexual act as a reproductive act, it is no more than an act of individual
gratification:
[S]exual acts [of same-sex partners] together cannot do
what they may hope and imagine. Because their
activation of one or even each of their reproductive
organs cannot be an actualizing and experiencing of the
88
89
90
91
92

Id. at 1065.
Id.
Id. at 1066.
Id.
Finnis, supra note 81, at 1066.
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marital good—as martial intercourse (intercourse
between spouses in a martial way) can, even between
spouses who happen to be sterile—it can do no more than
provide each partner with an individual gratification.93
Finnis limits the legitimate use of reproductive organs to realizing a
marital relationship that is open to the common good of reproduction.
Finnis characterizes sex relations between same-sex partners as
reducing their bodies and reproductive organs to self-gratification and
isolated selves rather than as a couple expressing mutuality of affection:
For want of a common good [procreation] that could be
actualized and experienced by and in this bodily union,
that conduct involves the partners in treating their
bodies as instruments to be used in the service of their
consciously experiencing selves; their choice to engage
in such conduct thus dis-integrates each of them
precisely as acting persons.94
Thus, Finnis ultimately denies that same-sex relations can involve
mutuality of love, affection, and recognition of the other in their
personhood. Sexual acts of homosexuals are reduced to their physical
character:
[No matter the] thoughts of giving with which some
same-sex partners may surround their sexual acts, those
acts cannot express or do more than is expressed or done
if two strangers engage in such activity to give each
other pleasure, or a prostitute pleasures a client to give
him pleasure in return for money, or (say) a man
masturbates to give himself pleasure and a fantasy of

93
Id. Finnis specifically rejects the claim that same-sex unions are open to procreation
were conditions different in the same way sterile couples would accept offspring:
Anal and oral intercourse, whether between spouses or between males,
is not a biological union ‘open to procreation’ . . . . Biological union
between humans is the inseminatory union of male genital organ with
female genital organ; in most circumstances it does not result in
generation, but it is the behavior that unites biologically because it is
the behavior which, as behavior, is suitable for generation.
Id.
94
Id. at 1066–67.
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more human relationship after a grueling day in the
assembly line.”95
Finnis denies any significance to a homosexual’s possible loving and
committed relationship, thus for Finnis, all homosexual sexual acts are
reduced to solitary sexual acts: “there is no important distinction in
essential moral worthlessness between solitary masturbation, being
sodomized as a prostitute, and being sodomized for the pleasure of it.”96
Finnis concludes that only marital sexual acts are moral and such
acts must be of the reproductive kind:
[S]exual acts are not unitive in their significance unless
they are marital (actualizing the all-level unity of
marriage) and (since the common good of marriage has
two aspects) they are not marital unless they have not
only the generosity of acts of friendship but also the
procreative significance, not necessarily of being
intended to generate or capable in the circumstances of
generating but at least of being, as human conduct, acts
of the reproductive kind—actualization, so far as the
spouses then and there can, of the reproductive function
in which they are biologically and thus personally one.97
The emphasis of Finnis on the unitive function of heterosexual marital
intercourse, which he maintains must be open to the possibility of
procreation, discounts the possibility of the unitive experience of most
sexual acts and diminishes the significance of expressions of love,
affection, and mutual self-giving that may occur in any sexual act.
Instead, Finnis seems to emphasize physical aspects of heterosexual
marital conjugal acts by essential coital relations, insemination, and
conception. Finnis’ account does not seem to coincide with the
emotional and psychological aspects of “making love” by many married
and unmarried couples, whether heterosexual or homosexual.
B. The Theology of Sexual Difference Opposed to Same-Sex Marriage
The new natural law theory primarily opposes same-sex marriage
from the position that an openness to procreation is an essential element
of marriage. An alternative basis for opposition to same-sex marriage is
the theology of sexual difference or sexual complementarity. Pope John
95
96
97

Id. at 1067.
Id.
Finnis, supra note 81, at 1067.
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Paul II provided significant support for this view in his Theology of the
Body.98 According to John Paul II, “[t]he theology of the body, which is
linked from the beginning with the creation of man in the image of God,
becomes in some way also a theology of sex, or rather a theology of
masculinity and femininity.”99 There are two important aspects of
gender; these are the double aspects “of man’s somatic constitution ( . . . she
is flesh from my flesh and bone from my bones)” and the meaning of the
human body which attains completion in “reciprocal enrichment” through
the relationship of the two sexes.100 This relationship of the two sexes in
turn depends on sexual difference or “two incarnations” which involve:
“two reciprocally completing ways of ‘being a body’ and at the same time of
being human—as two complementary dimensions of self-knowledge and
self-determination and, at the same time, two complementary ways of being
conscious of the meaning of the body.”101
It is the “presence of the feminine element, next to the masculine and
together with it, [that] signifies an enrichment for man.”102 In marriage
that sexual difference and complementarity is realized: “masculinity and
femininity, as that characteristic of man—male and female—that allows
them, when they become one flesh, to place their whole humanity at the
same time under the blessing of fruitfulness” which returns them “to
[the] union in humanity . . . [that] allows them to recognize each other
reciprocally.”103
Germain Grisez developed the theology of the complementarity
nature of female and male as a basis for understanding the nature and
significance of marriage.104 Grisez developed a highly differentiated
notion of sexual difference that underlies the concept of complementarity
function in which “both sexes are naturally needed to fulfill
complementary social roles.”105 This role differentiation is rather
specific:
[W]hile fathers should share in the care of their small
children, the primary responsibility in this matter
naturally falls to mothers; and while women can help

98
JOHN PAUL II, MAN AND WOMAN HE CREATED THEM: A THEOLOGY OF THE BODY 165
(2006).
99
Id.
100
See id. (quoting Genesis 2:23).
101
Id. at 166 (internal quotation marks omitted).
102
Id.
103
Id. at 167.
104
See generally GERMAN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS, VOLUME TWO: LIVING A
CHRISTIAN LIFE (1993) (discussing the roles of men and women in society).
105
Id. at 388.
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deal with challenges which must be repelled by physical
force, generally men are better suited by nature to
organize such actions and execute them.106
It is the view that essential sexual differences underlie the sexually
differentiated roles which are central to the definition of marriage, as
between one man and one woman: “[t]his affirmation of the difference
between men and women implies the legitimacy of sexually
“[b]y
differentiated roles in marriage.”107 According to Grisez:
differentiating the sexes, God plainly intends to differentiate the spouses’
roles” and “this natural differentiation serves the good of marriage and
family.”108 The view that this difference in roles is rooted in “biological
necessities” is at the heart of this argument: “[n]ot only physiologically
but psychologically, women naturally are adapted to this nurturing
role.”109 This sexual difference does not only play a role in fulfilling the
complementary nature of marriage, but is essential to proper and
effective child rearing.110 Grisez does not deny a role for the male in
child rearing, but sees it as complementary and additive: “the
development of children not only calls for the fulfillment of both roles
but for their differentiation.”111 These roles involve both nurturing and
challenging as “[b]oth parents can and should share to some extent in
doing both things, but neither can do both fully at the same
time[;] . . . the spouses must accept different responsibilities and carry
them out consistently for the good of their children.”112 Nevertheless,
even if it is important for parents to take on these differing roles, there is
of course the possibility of meeting the needs of nurturing and
challenging and being taken on by either of the partners to a same-sex
marriage.
The argument about sexual difference and its significance in the
debate about same-sex unions is the subject of an article by Daniel Avila,
the Associate Director for Policy and Research for the Massachusetts
Catholic Conference in Boston.113 Avila notes that the California
Supreme Court decision in 2008 recognized same-sex partners’ right to

Id.
Id. at 617.
108
Id. at 626.
109
Id. at 627.
110
GRISEZ, supra note 104, at 628.
111
See id. (expressing that both parents have an important role in child rearing).
112
Id.
113
See Daniel Avila, Sexual Difference and Marriage: An Urgent Need for New Studies, 9
NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 441, 441–42 (2009) (discussing sexual differences and their
relation to same-sex marriage).
106
107
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state protected marriage because marriage “could not be limited by any
reference to sexual difference.”114 The California court found that samesex family relationships are comparable in stature and equal in dignity to
family relationships of opposite sex couples.115 The court found that a
refusal to recognize a marriage “based on sex differences supposedly
masks an unfairness and inequality,” because sexual difference of
partners is irrelevant to marriage.116
Avila argues that the California court was wrong in rejecting sexual
difference as essential to marriage, but he admits that the defenders of
Catholic doctrine, recognizing the significance of sexual difference, have
not developed their argument by proof of the significance of sexual
difference in the raising of children.117 According to Avila: “[d]efenders
of traditional marriage must be prepared to offer reasons why society
must continue to recognize sexual difference as a fundamental attribute
of marriage, argued in terms that carry authority and meaning in today’s
post-Christian ethos.”118
Avila makes clear that sexual difference is seen as a basic
characteristic of marriage. Pope John Paul II is cited for teaching that
“the natural dimension of masculinity and femininity is crucial for
understanding the essence of marriage.”119 Pope Benedict XVI is cited
for the view that “marriage has a truth of its own[;] . . . the sexually
different reality of the man and of the woman with their profound needs
for complementarity, definitive self-giving and exclusivity.”120
Moreover, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith has provided a
further reason for the requirement of sexual difference and
complementarity in marriage:
[T]he absence of sexual complementarity in these [samesex] unions creates obstacles in the normal development
114
See id. at 442 (citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008)). “This decision
has been reversed by Proposition 8, a voter-initiated constitutional amendment that defines
marriage as a union of man and woman, but leaves intact California laws granting equal
recognition to same-sex relationships.” Id.; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 755 F.3d
1193 (No. 14124), http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/14124.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/Q38N-5BPT (setting out the proceedings for the
pending case).
115
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 452.
116
See Avila, supra note 113, at 442 (noting that sex differences are being used as a form of
discrimination) (citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 452).
117
Id. at 442, 444.
118
Id. at 442.
119
Id. (citing John Paul II, Address to the prelate auditors, officials and advocates of the
Tribunal of the Roman Rota (Feb. 1, 2001)).
120
Id. at 443 (citing Benedict XVI, Address to the members of the Tribunal of the Roman
Rota (Jan. 27, 2007)).
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of children who would be placed in these unions. They
would be deprived of the experience of either
fatherhood or motherhood . . . [and] their condition of
dependency would be used to place them in an
environment that is not conducive to their full human
development.121
Avila maintains the argument that marriage demands sexual
difference and complementarity cannot rest on the mere assertion that
marriage is by tradition or definition between a man and a woman.122
Rather, he claims there is a need to provide significantly more content to
such terms as “masculinity, femininity, motherhood, fatherhood,
complementarity, normal, and full human development.”123 Some of the
questions that must be addressed include:
Is the sex of an individual just an accidental feature in
terms of its relevance to the institutional design,
purposes, privileges, and benefits of marriage? Or is
there something uniquely substantial in sexual
difference and in the love that arises from and is based
on sexual complementarity that must govern policy and
practice?124
Avila concludes that the defenders of sexual difference need to do more
“to identify and verify the defining traits of masculinity and femininity
and, by extension, the essence of fatherhood and motherhood.” 125 This
would seem to require empirical research, rather than mere assertion of
tradition and presuppositions. Avila admits that some critics argue that
the theory of sexual difference is based on stereotypes, while other critics
claim there is no difference between men and women beyond
physiology.126 Yet, others claim love and not gender make relationships
marital, or that physiological sex differences such as those involved in
pregnancy are no more significant than other presumed differences that
can give rise to the complementarity which forms the basis of same-sex
relations that can qualify as marriage.127

121
Id. (citing Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Considerations Regarding Proposals
to Give Legal Recognition to Unions between Homosexual Persons (June 3, 2003)).
122
Avila, supra note 113, at 444.
123
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 445.
127
Id.
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C. Same-Sex Marriage is Contrary to the Common Good
The concept of the common good is central to Roman Catholic Social
teaching.128 The concept was implicitly acknowledged by Pope Leo XIII
in his encyclical Review Novarum in 1891 and by Pope Pius XI in
Quadragesimo Anno in 1931.129 Pope John XXIII gave explicit recognition
to the concept in his encyclical Mater et Magistra in 1961 where the Pope
stated that the government is justified in acting on behalf of the common
good.130 In his encyclical Pacem in Terris in 1963, Pope John XXIII
explicitly recognized that the common good is intimately tied to human
nature.131
Robert Batule, a professor of systematic theology at the University of
the Immaculate Conception in Lloyd Harbor, New York, has argued that
“[t]he common good is inexorably applicable to marriage and the
family.”132 He maintains that the partners to a marriage merge their
personal goods, and that the result is their personal goods in marriage
are submerged in a contribution to “a common good.”133 According to
Batule’s argument, “[a]n undeniable good of marriage is the children
[that are begotten and raised] . . . establishing an especially important
element of social posterity.”134 Batule goes on to argue that “the only
128
See J. MILBURN THOMPSON, INTRODUCING CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 59–60 (2010)
(addressing the concept of the common good).
129
See generally Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum: Rights and Duties of Capital and Labor,
VATICAN (May 15, 1891), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/
encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum_en.html,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/8VHA-9M7W (discussing the common good as it relates to Catholic
teaching); Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno: Encyclical on Pope Pius XI on Reconstruction of
the Social Order To Our Venerable Brethren, the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, Bishops, and
Other Ordinaries in Peace and Communion with the Apostolic See, and Likewise to all the Faithful
of the Catholic World, VATICAN (May 15, 1931), available at http://www.vatican.va/
holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno_
en.html, archived at http://perma.cc/A3HV-7B6D (acknowledging the concept of the
common good).
130
See generally Pope John XXIII, Mater et Magistra: Encyclical of Pope John XXIII on
Christianity and Social Progress, VATICAN (May 15, 1961), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_15
051961_mater_en.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8TFV-Z2XA (calling the State to act for
the common good).
131
See generally Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris: Encyclical of Pope John XXIII on
Establishing Universal Peace in Truth, Justice, Charity, and Liberty, VATICAN (Apr. 11, 1963),
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jxxiii_enc_11041963_pacem_en.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3TRC-VTXX (connecting
the common good to human nature).
132
Robert J. Batule, Defending Marriage: How Faith and Reason are of the Same Mind, 66
PRIEST 36, 41 (2010).
133
See id. (discussing the common good in relation to marriage).
134
Id.
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origin that adequately safeguards children’s identity is the necessary,
intimate, integral, mutual[,] and permanent union of spouses.”135 The
assertion is that the heterosexual marriage which produces children is
“the context which most readily provides emotional security and
guarantees greater unity and continuity in the process of social
Accordingly, other forms of the family unit are
integration.”136
detrimental to child development: “growing up in an intact two-parent
family is an important source of advantage [for children].”137
Batule maintains that same-sex couples are not capable of
biologically producing children, although reproductive technologies,
surrogates, or adoption can provide children for the same-sex couple.138
Batule claims that such children raised by same-sex parents do not thrive
to the same extent as children in traditional families and studies that
claim otherwise are flawed.139 Batule argues that: “children raised by a
married mother and father fare better than children raised by same-sex
partners[;] . . . [c]hildren do best when raised by their own married
mother and father.”140 Batule concludes that the common good is best
served by limiting marriage to the couple whose relationship is open to
procreation, rather than accepting the concept of marriage as primarily a
private, emotional relationship which he sees as the fundamental basis of
same-sex partners claim to a right to marriage.141
Russell Shaw, in An Argument Against Gay Marriage, goes farther
than arguing heterosexual marriage is superior to same-sex marriage by
asserting recognition of same-sex marriage will weaken heterosexual
marriage: “the case for legalizing gay marriage rests on the ideology of
cultural relativism. And this is an ideology whose principle practical
effect is progressively to undermine and ultimately to dissolve social
institutions and relationships based on ideas like ‘natural’ and ‘nature,’
‘true’ and ‘truth.’”142 The basic argument is that from the point of view

See id. (citing Pontifical Council for the Family, Family, Marriage, and De Facto Unions,
30 ORIGINS 475–88 (2000)).
136
Id.
137
See id. (citing Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, 271 ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 50, 80 (1993)).
138
See Batule, supra note 132, at 41–42 (providing Batule’s theories on same-sex couples
and children).
139
Id. (addressing parenting in heterosexual families and the defects in studies regarding
same-sex parents).
140
See id. (citing Maggie Gallagher & Joshua Baker, Do Moms and Dads Matter? Evidence
From the Social Sciences on Family Structure and the Best Interests of the Child, 4 U. MD. L.J. 174,
174, 180 (2004)).
141
Id.
142
Russell Shaw, An Argument Against Gay Marriage, 80 COLUMBIA 19, 19 (2000).
135
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of cultural relativism, marriage is a social construct open to alteration
and reformulation:
[I]t makes no sense to say, “A marriage is by nature a
relationship between a woman and a man.” The reason
it makes no sense is that the idea of “nature” itself has
no meaning. “Nature” and “natural relationships” are
words people use in speaking of certain social
conventions. There is no bedrock reality to which they
refer.143
Stanley Kurtz, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, does not
disagree with Shaw that recognition of same-sex marriage threatens the
social consensus on the morality of marriage.144 Kurtz writes: “[g]ay
marriage would set in motion a series of threats to the ethos of
monogamy from which the institution of marriage may never
recover.”145 However, Kurtz recognizes that the general abandonment of
the taboo against homosexuality and the claims to personal freedom by
homosexuals to the right to marry justify recognition of same-sex
marriage; Kurtz concludes: “I would rather accept some disruption in
family stability than go back to the days when homosexuality itself was
deeply tabooed. The increase in freedom and fairness is worth it.”146
Russell Shaw, however, argues that preserving traditional marriage
is essential for the important goal of mentoring society and that “the best
argument against legalizing same-sex marriage is the harm done to
traditional marriage.”147 Shaw concludes: “No-fault divorce provides
the precedent here. Changing the meaning of marriage to accommodate
libertarian morality—which essentially is what happened on this case—
contributed to the weakening of traditional marriage visible in statistics
in recent decades.”148
Kurtz’s position seems to be based on the view that men are less
monogamous than women, so that a marriage of two men would be less
stable than a heterosexual marriage. Of course by implication, a lesbian
marriage would be the most stable. Even if Kurtz is correct in his
Id.
Stanley Kurtz, The Libertarian Question: Incest, Homosexuality, and Adultery, in SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 265 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum
eds., 2d ed. 2004).
145
Id. at 268.
146
See id. at 267 (discussing societal taboos surrounding marriage).
147
Robert Shaw, Marriage and the New Morality, VIRTUEONLINE (Aug. 27, 2010), available at
http://www.virtueonline.org/marriage-and-new-morality-russell-shaw,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/F9F7-MHBR.
148
Id.
143
144
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assessment of male human nature, there is no evidence that marriage
might not curb male promiscuity. Moreover, there is no evidence that
any instability in same-sex marriage would cause heterosexual husbands
to wander.
Shaw’s argument against same-sex marriage is based on the
common good view of procreating and child rearing as the principle
social benefit of legal recognition of the family unit. Instead, it can be
argued that the family, or household, forms the social bedrock of society
because of the mutual dependence and responsibility of members of the
family for each other. Opposition to same-sex marriage preserves the
status of isolated homosexuals which serves as a basis for the traditional
criticism of homosexual acts. Same-sex marriage creates a social relation
in which the homosexual couple may experience monogamy, mutual
love, affection, and support. Same-sex marriages establish additional
families providing for their members, including their children, reducing
the need for social services and welfare, which would otherwise be
required for individuals denied the opportunity to form family units.
IV. REVISIONIST CHALLENGE TO TEACHING OF THE MAGISTERIUM
A. Challenge to Homosexuality as an Objective Disorder
There is significant disagreement between the Magisterium and
many contemporary Roman Catholic theologians on the subject of
homosexuality. Some theologians concede to the Magisterium’s teaching
that heterosexual relations are normative, but urge an accepting pastoral
approach for homosexual persons.149 Others suggest that the morality of
sexual acts, whether heterosexual or homosexual, depends on the quality
of the relationship between the sexual partners.150
Some theologians suggest that homosexual relations are as normal as
heterosexual relations. For example, Daniel Maguire, a theologian
teaching at Marquette University, argues that homosexuality is natural
and “part of God’s plan for creation—some people are heterosexual and
some are homosexual—this is the way God made us.”151 Similarly,
“[t]he desire to bond lovingly and sexually with persons of the same sex
See generally Lisa Sowle Cahill, Moral Methodology: A Case Study, in INTRODUCTION TO
CHRISTIAN ETHICS 551–62 (Ronald P. Hamel & Kenneth R. Hines eds., 1989) (discussing an
approach based on Christian ethics which provides an adequate Christian response to
homosexuality).
150
Gregory Baum, Catholic Homosexuals, 99 COMMONWEAL 479, 479–82 (1974).
151
Daniel C. Maguire, A Catholic Defense of Same-Sex Marriage, RELIGIOUS CONSULTATION
ON
POPULATION, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND ETHICS (Apr.
20,
2006),
http://www.religiousconsultation.org/Catholic_defense_of_same_sex_marriage.htm,
archived at http://perma.cc/VG35-69MH.
149

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 1 [2015], Art. 8

30

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

or of the opposite sex, is a fact of life, a fact of God’s creation, and we
have no right to call it unholy.”152
While acknowledging the condemnation of homosexual sex and
same-sex marriage in documents issued by the Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith, Maguire maintains that this teaching is wrong.153
Maguire identifies three sources of church teaching, “or three
“magisteria” of the Magisterium: “the hierarchy, the theologians, and the
wisdom and experience of the laity.”154 Maguire asserts that over the course
of history each of these sources has erred.155 Today, Maguire argues,
many theologians and a significant segment of the laity reject the Vatican
Facing this disagreement Maguire
teaching on homosexuality.156
maintains that one can invoke the tradition of Probabilism that provides:
“[w]hen there is debate on a moral issue [such as same-sex unions, and],
where there are good reasons and good authorities on both sides of the
debate, Catholics are free to make up their own minds.”157 Maguire
concludes that since condemning homosexuals to an involuntary life of
celibacy would be cruel and absurd, it is reasonable to reject the
Magisterium’s position on homosexuality.158
Jack Bonsor, a lecturer in theology at Santa Clara University, engages
the teaching of the Magisterium on homosexuality with a more nuanced
argument.159 Bonsor begins with the presumption that sexual orientation
is not chosen, but rather is a deep-rooted condition or instinct that is
discovered.160 According to Bonsor, sexuality involves more than erotic
passion, but also involves “friendship, intimacy, and romantic
relationships.”161 Bonsor challenges the Magisterium’s judgment that
homosexuality, or the homosexual inclination, is an objective disorder.162
According to Bonsor, the Magisterium roots its view in the metaphysical
anthropology of Thomas Aquinas.163 Aquinas sees the soul as the cause
of “[h]uman sexual desire [when it] is directed toward the good of
Id.
Id.
154
Id. The “experience of the laity” is referred to in Latin as the sensus fidelium. Id.
155
Id.
156
Maguire, supra note 151.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
See Jack A. Bonsor, Homosexual, Orientation and Anthropology: Reflections on the Category
“Objective Disorder,” 59 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 60, 61–62 (1998) (proposing that Magisterium’s
justifications are at odds with its conclusions regarding homosexuality and same-sex
marriage).
160
Id. at 60.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 61.
163
Id. at 65–66.
152
153
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human procreation.”164 In Aquinas’ view, this is true for all humans at
all times because for every human being, the soul is the form of the body
directly created by God.165 God’s direct action is not part of human
development or evolution.166 Thus, for each person God directly creates
and infuses a soul into the evolved human individual.167 The ordered
soul possesses the natural inclinations such as the urge toward
procreation.168 Bonsor identifies this as the theological ground for the
Magisterium’s “universal claim that homosexual orientation is an
objective disorder.”169
While the Magisterium has embraced human evolutionary theory at
the physical level, Bonsor argues that it maintains the view of “the direct
creation of the soul” as part of its metaphysical anthropology.170 Bonsor
points out that when considering homosexual orientation, the
Magisterium’s view of evolutionary science is restricted by the
metaphysics of direct infusion of the soul along with a literal
understanding of Genesis, in which Adam’s sin directly affects human
biology by producing the homosexual inclination infecting the directlyinfused soul.171 To the contrary, Bonsor argues that self-consciousness
and thought evolve by similar natural processes as physical evolution.172
Bonsor concludes: “[i]f human nature evolves, perhaps homosexual
orientation is a possibility served up by nature for human sexuality,
intimacy, and love. Perhaps homosexual orientation falls within divine
providence, a providence that works within a cosmos wherein nature
pursues multiple and diverse possibilities.”173
Margaret Farley acknowledges that an understanding of
homosexuality as an inborn characteristic, such as the evolutionary or
adaptive feature recognized by Bonsor, has been an important reason for
some religious traditions’ acceptance of homosexuals.174 Farley quotes
one commentator: “since homosexuality is not chosen, it cannot be
immoral . . . [since] God would not demand of human beings something

Id.
Bonsor, supra note 159, at 66.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 70.
168
Id. at 66.
169
Id. at 70.
170
Id. at 71.
171
Bonsor, supra note 159, at 72.
172
Id. at 76.
173
Id. at 79.
174
MARGARET A. FARLEY, JUST LOVE: A FRAMEWORK FOR CHRISTIAN SEXUAL ETHICS 294
(2006).
164
165
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they cannot possibly obey.”175 On the other hand, Farley wants to
maintain that human sexuality is highly complex, takes a variety of
forms, and that social justice demands respect for the way individuals
realize their sexual orientation or preference.176
B. Challenge to Procreation and Biological Complementarity as Necessary
Elements of Marriage
Some of the most sophisticated and compelling criticisms of
Magisterial teaching on homosexuality and same-sex marriage are
provided by Todd A. Salzman, a theologian teaching at Creighton
University, and Michael Lawler, an Emeritus professor of theology at
Creighton.177 Salzman and Lawler challenge the claim that procreation is
an essential element of marriage, since children are a possibility and not
indispensable consequence of marriage.178 Moreover, they maintain that
sexual intercourse should not be viewed as exclusively for biological
procreation, but also for expression of love and affection.179 Salzman and
Lawler argue that even the teaching of the Magisterium has moved from
the primarily procreative model of marriage to “a more personal model
of conjugal love and intimacy.”180 According to Salzman and Lawler:
175
See id. (quoting Judith Plaskow, Lesbian and Gay Rights: Asking the Right Questions, 9
TIKKUN 31, 31 (1992)).
176
Id. at 294–95.
177
See generally Todd A. Salzman & Michael G. Lawler, New Natural Law Theory and
Foundational Sexual Ethical Principles: A Critique and a Proposal, 47 HEYTHROP J. 182–205
(2006) (critiquing the foundational principles of The New Natural Law Theory and arguing
alternative principles that would justify sexual acts of homosexual couples); Todd A.
Salzman & Michael G. Lawler, Quaestio Disputata: Catholic Social Ethics: Complementarity
and the Truly Human, 67 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 625–52 (2006) [hereinafter Quaestio
Disputata] (discussing the types of complementarity that the Magisterium finds in a truly
human sexual act); TODD A. SALZMAN & MICHAEL G. LAWLER, SEXUAL ETHICS: A
THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION 155–90 (2012) [hereinafter SEXUAL ETHICS] (discussing the
Bible, homosexuality, and the Magisterial teaching); TODD A. SALZMAN & MICHAEL G.
LAWLER, THE SEXUAL PERSON: TOWARD A RENEWED CATHOLIC ANTHROPOLOGY 214–35
(2008) (analyzing an empirical theology approach to addressing traditional norms); Todd
A. Salzman & Michael G. Lawler, Theology, Science, and Sexual Anthropology: An
Investigation, in TO DISCERN CREATION IN A SCATTERING WORLD 297–316 (Board of
Ephiemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 2013) (evaluating the current situation of
theological anthropology); Todd A. Salzman & Michael G. Lawler, Truly Human Sexual
Acts: A Response to Patrick Lee and Robert George, 69 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 663–80 (2008)
(responding to Mr. Lee and Mr. George’s classicist approach to sexual norms and sexual
orientation).
178
See SEXUAL ETHICS, supra note 177, at 98 (“[C]hildren add nothing to that plentitude,
except that they make the spouses father and mother. Children are added to marriage as ‘a
possible and not an indispensable consequence of marriage.”).
179
Id. at 99.
180
Id. at 102.
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[Conjugal] love is uniquely expressed and perfected
through the marital act [whether open to procreation or
not]. The actions within marriage by which the couples
are united intimately and chastely are noble and worthy
ones. Expressed in a manner which is truly human,
these actions signify and promote that mutual selfgiving by which spouses enrich each . . . .181
Salzman and Lawler directly address the requirement of sexual
complementarity central to the CDF Considerations dealing with same-sex
Salzman and Lawler observe that the concept of
unions.182
complementarity has significance in two primary ways in the Magisterial
teaching: first, as biological complementarity including heterogenital
and reproductive; and second, as personal and psychological
complementarity.183 Salzman and Lawler observe: “[t]he [M]agisterium
condemns homosexual acts because they do not exhibit heterogenital
and reproductive complementarities and, because they do not exhibit
these biological complementarities, they are ontologically incapable of
realizing personal complementarity, regardless of the meaning of the act
Salzman and Lawler argue that
for a homosexual couple.”184
heterogenital and biological complementarity may be features of a
marriage, but are not necessary elements of a marriage.185 They maintain
that “monogamous, loving, committed, homosexual couples . . . do
experience affective and communion complementarity in and through
their homosexual acts.”186 With this understanding of the legitimacy of
non-procreative sexual acts and the essential interpersonal character of
marriage, Salzman and Lawler find no persuasive argument against
same-sex marriage.187
The view of Salzman and Lawler that the Magisterium’s view of
biological complementarity is essentially flawed is a logical conclusion
from their premise that procreation is not an essential element of
marriage.188 They argue that to the contrary:

Id. at 107.
See Quaestio Disputata, supra note 177, at 627–29 (discussing three concerns found in
Pope Paul II’s theology).
183
Id. at 629–30.
184
Id. at 644–45.
185
Id. at 645–46.
186
Id. at 645.
187
Id. at 645–46.
188
See Quaestio Disputata, supra note 177, at 646 (“Though they cannot exhibit genital
complementarity homosexual individuals can exhibit the holistic complementarity.”).
181
182
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[T]he needed complementarity for a truly sexual act
[and marriage] is holistic complementarity that unites
people bodily, affectively, spiritually, and personally in
light of a person’s sexual orientation. Heterogenital
complementarity is needed for reproduction, but it is not
needed for the sexual, affective, spiritual, and personal
connection between two people that the recent Catholic
tradition acknowledges as an end of marriage equal to
procreation.189
The complementarity which plays an important part in married life has
psychological and social dimensions that are not dependent on genital
difference or reflect social mandated stereotypes. Homosexual couples
express psychological and emotional differences which form the basis for
their complementarity, while being committed to the same shared lives
lived by heterosexual couples.
C. Same-Sex Families, the Common Good, and Child Raising
The Magisterium maintains that same-sex unions are detrimental to
the common good primarily because same-sex parents deny children a
developmental environment that includes both male and female parents.
Stephen Pope, a professor of theology at Boston College, challenges this
position.190 Pope objects to the CDF’s language in Considerations that
states that the same-sex family does “violence” to the children in it
because the environment is not “conducive to their full development.”191
Pope maintains that this language involves distortion and “implies that
foster parents, single parents, and parents with serious physical or
psychological handicaps, no matter how hard they try, are guilty of
inflicting ‘violence’ on their children since they, too, consent to raise their
children under less than optimal conditions.”192
Pope’s main argument is that the choice for many children is not
between an environment with heterosexual rather than homosexual
parents, but instead, between placement with a same-sex couple as an

Id. at 645–46.
See Stephen Pope, The Vatican’s Blunt Instrument, CLGS (Aug. 9, 2003),
http://www.clgs.org/resource-library/vaticans-blunt-instrument,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/P8NX-LT9Q (“In the single most criticized claim in this document, the
CDF holds that allowing children to be adopted by same-sex couples subjects them to
‘violence,’ at least in the sense that it would not be ‘conductive to their full human
development.’”).
191
Id.
192
Id.
189
190
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alternative to an institution.193 Pope maintains: “[t]he [CDF] document
fails to give the slightest acknowledgement of the profound, long-lasting
concrete good that is provided by some gay adoptive parents to their
children.”194 According to Pope, the CDF fails to recognize the
contribution to the common good resulting from “[an] adoption by a
same-sex couple committed to providing a stable, loving[,] and
respectful family environment for a child’s upbringing.”195
The fundamental flaw in the Magisterium’s claim that same-sex
parents are a detriment to their children is that it is not based on
empirical evidence. In fact, studies of children raised by same-sex
parents have “failed to produce conclusive evidence that the children of
lesbian mothers or gay fathers have significant difficulties in
development relative to children of heterosexual parents.”196
The early studies on same-sex parenting were subject to various
methodological criticisms, including reliance on small and nonrandom
samples, and researcher bias.197 However, more recent studies are
considered scientifically valid; these studies test children directly, as well
as relying on parent’s reports and evaluations from teachers.198 These
studies reveal “no significant differences between children of lesbian
mothers and children of heterosexual mothers in anxiety, depression,
self-esteem, and numerous other measures of social and psychological
adjustment.”199 To date, those studies recognized as scientifically valid
have revealed no differences between children reared in same-sex couple
households and those reared in heterosexual households in the level of
cognitive functioning, the level of parental investment in children, and
other indicators of well-being.200
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V. CONCLUDING ASSESSMENT OF THE TEACHING OF THE MAGISTERIUM ON
HOMOSEXUALITY AND SAME-SEX UNIONS
The Magisterium’s teaching recognizes homosexuality as a sexual
orientation and a possible deep rooted condition.
Thus, this
understanding of homosexuality suggests it is not a matter of choice of
sexual partners or choice of lifestyle. However, the view that is taken of
homosexuals and homosexual acts is limited to the individual person
who, for the most part, is viewed as seeking personal gratification from
sexual acts. There is an explicit view of homosexual acts as necessarily
solitary and non-unitive. There has been, however, a significant change
in society that now accepts homosexual couples enjoying a life of
intimate association based on love, affection, and mutual support.
Homosexual sex acts take on a new meaning when considered as
expressions of the love, affection, and support of sexual partners, rather
than isolated acts of homosexual persons.
Once one recognizes that homosexuality involves a deep-seated
aspect of the person and personality, it makes no sense to criminally
prosecute the conduct that is an expression of the personality. It also
questions whether the expression of such a personality characteristic in
conduct in an intimate relationship should be considered immoral.
Moreover, when homosexual acts are seen as expression of interpersonal intimacy, rather than acts of personal gratification, one can see
validity to a claim that the varying inter-personal relationships should be
recognized as moral. Even if one continues to maintain the position that
homosexuality is a disorder and that the homosexual act is an ontic or
pre-moral evil, it would seem appropriate to consider the content and
circumstances of the homosexual act as an expression of the
monogamous commitment of love, affection, and support between the
members of the homosexual couple, so that a homosexual act ultimately
can be viewed as moral.
This Article examined the Magisterium’s arguments against samesex unions that are based on understandings derived from moral
theology and anthropology, but did not closely examine religious
arguments based on Scripture or sacramental belief. I would maintain
that the Magisterium’s non-Scriptural arguments against the state
recognizing same-sex unions by extending civil marriage to homosexuals
are not persuasive. Challenges to these claims have been set out in this
Article’s commentary on the Magisterial documents and in the review of
revisionist theologians’ arguments.
The objective of the Magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church in
publishing Consideration Regarding Proposals to Give Recognition to Unions
Between Homosexual Persons was to provide a convincing, non-scriptural
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argument that would persuade the rational legislator or judge to reject
claims for access to same-sex marriage. These arguments depend on
psychological and anthropological assumptions that are open to
reasonable debate.
The Magisterium’s teachings reveal a limited understanding of the
meaning of sexual relations in contemporary life, take the view that
homosexuality involves an isolated individual seeking experiences of
personal gratification, and adopts an understanding of gender roles as
stereotypical and traditional. Ultimately, the Magisterium’s position on
same-sex marriage depends on premises about genital complementarity
between the sexes which provides the possibility of procreation and
gender complimentarity that facilitates childbearing. Those premises are
subject to the convincing criticism that they involve a restricted
physicalistic understanding of sexual relations, gender stereotyping, and
an excessively limited view of the nature of intimate sexual relationships.
The Magisterium’s arguments cumulatively fail to establish a compelling
foundation for opposing legally recognized same-sex marriage. As a
result of the church’s views that sexual acts in a marriage involve mutual
love and support, and since canon law does not prohibit sterile persons
from marrying, the Magisterium implicitly recognizes that the ability to
procreate is not an essential factor of marriage; thus the persuasiveness
of the Magisterium’s argument against legal recognition of same-sex
marriage is further undermined by its own teaching. Ultimately, the
Roman Catholic Church Magisterium’s failure to recognize that today
many same-sex parties express a committed, monogamous, and loving
relationship, and often form a family with children contributing to the
common good; this fact further undermines the Catholic Church’s
opposition to legal recognition of same-sex marriage.
Recognition of same-sex marriage would further the state’s interest
in establishing families and households that facilitate individual
members providing for each other out of love and commitment to
mutually care for each other. The common good is served by reducing
the likelihood of society’s need to care for those who would otherwise
become dependent and require public support.
Moreover, legal
recognition of same-sex marriage can provide such families social
support and access to legal and community resources important for
caring for and educating children and for facilitating the mutual support
of the individuals who have joined themselves together in a loving
relationship. The common good is furthered by the establishment of the
household resulting from legal recognition of same-sex marriages
involving loving partners, often raising children, producing families
committed to mutual support, and affectionate caring for each other.
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